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Abstract
This paper investigates whether a financial system can be made more stable if financial insti-
tutions share risk by exchanging contingent convertible (CoCo) debt obligations. The question
is framed in a financial network model of debt and equity interlinkages with the addition of
a variant of the CoCo that converts continuously when a bank’s equity-debt ratio drops to a
trigger level. The main theoretical result is a complete characterization of the clearing problem
for the interbank debt and equity at the maturity of the obligations. We then consider a simple
setting in which introducing contingent convertible bonds improves financial stability, as well
as specific networks for which contingent convertible bonds do not provide uniformly improved
system performance. To return to the main question, we examine the EU financial network
at the time of the 2011 EBA stress test to do comparative statics to study the implications of
CoCo debt on financial stability. It is found that by replacing all unsecured interbank debt by
standardized CoCo interbank debt securities, systemic risk in the EU will decrease and bank
shareholder value will increase.
1 Introduction
Systemic risk is the risk of financial contagion – the spread of losses from one bank or institution
to other firms through interconnections in the financial system. This type of risk was exhibited
most prominently in the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. The deep losses incurred by the
real economy as a result of that crisis show the need for a better understanding of financial
contagion to mitigate the impact of such events in the future.
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In the wake of the 2007-2009 financial crisis, contingent convertible bonds were introduced
into European markets. This financial instrument is a derivative contract that converts debt to
equity at a pre-defined debt-equity ratio. Since these instruments may improve the solvency of
the issuing company, they have become prominent in discussions on financial regulation. We
refer to Glasserman and Nouri (2012); Avdjiev et al. (2013); Spiegeleer et al. (2018) for detailed
discussion of specific kinds of convertible bonds and methodologies for pricing these obligations
in a single institution setting. Gupta et al. (2019) presents a case study of the use of contingent
convertible debts for reducing systemic risk when all such obligations are due outside the financial
system. The present model of networks with contingent convertible obligations is, fundamentally,
a variation of the network clearing model first proposed by Eisenberg and Noe (2001) that
accounts for bankruptcy costs as proposed in Rogers and Veraart (2013), and equity cross-
holdings between financial institutions as modeled in Suzuki (2002); Gouriéroux et al. (2012).
We wish to highlight the related work of Weber and Weske (2017) which also considers the joint
impacts of bankruptcy costs and equity cross-holdings, assuming fractional recovery of the value
of equity in case it is sold to pay off liabilities.
The above cited works consider only fixed banking books where each firm has only “vanilla”
external and interbank assets and liabilities. This fixed network assumption no longer holds
when derivatives such as contingent convertible bonds (CoCos) are included. For networks with
contingent payments based on generalized credit default swap obligations, Schuldenzucker et al.
(2017, 2019) show that the clearing payments may not be well-defined and, in fact, may not
exist outside of specific network topologies. Klages-Mundt and Minca (2020) studies reinsurance
networks and is able to determine the existence and uniqueness of the realized liabilities and
clearing payments between firms in the system. Banerjee and Feinstein (2019) presents a model
in the vein of Banerjee et al. (2018) that is a time dynamic extension of Eisenberg and Noe
(2001) for interbank liabilities with insurance obligations contingent on the state of the financial
system.
The motivation of the present paper is to understand the implications of contingent con-
vertible bonds on financial stability within a contingent network model. In contrast to the
above cited papers, we are able to characterize network clearing with contingent convertible
bonds as a standard equilibrium problem in terms of a fixed point condition on a single vector
of firm wealths, see Veraart (2019); Barucca et al. (2016); Banerjee and Feinstein (2019, 2020);
Banerjee et al. (2018), rather than joint payment and equity vectors as studied in Suzuki (2002);
Gouriéroux et al. (2012); Weber and Weske (2017). This is made possible by adopting a CoCo
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variant with fractional conversion, as introduced in Glasserman and Nouri (2012). This frac-
tional conversion avoids many of the fixed point problems detailed in, e.g., Kusnetsov and Veraart
(2019); Banerjee and Feinstein (2019), in which cycles exist in which either the bond is converted
or not. With these innovations, our first main contribution is to prove general conditions for
the existence of maximal and minimal clearing solutions for the contingent network model with
bankruptcy costs.
The second main contribution of this paper is to apply this contingent network framework
to understand the conditions under which CoCo bonds improve financial stability. We provide a
general discussion of when CoCo liabilities do and do not reduce the number of defaulting banks.
Finally, we produce a stress testing framework to study the impacts of contingent convertible
debts on financial stability within the EU financial system as it appeared in the 2011 EBA stress
testing database. This study leads to the observation that replacing unsecured interbank debt
in the EU financial system by CoCo securities will usually improve systemic risk.
The organization of this paper is as follows. First, in Section 2, we present contingent
convertible bonds for a single bank, with an emphasis on the CoCo variant with fractional con-
version. We extend this setting to a network setup of contingent convertible bonds in Section 3
where we present the main result of this work – the existence of maximal and minimal clear-
ing solutions for the interbank network with contingent convertible bonds. We expound upon
this result in Section 4 with a general discussion of when contingent convertible bonds improve
financial stability and a provide an example of a small network showing that introducing such
financial instruments may increase the number of defaults in the system. We extend this work
in Section 5 to networks of contingent convertible bonds in a discrete time framework where
conversion may occur before the maturity date. In Section 6 we utilize the 2011 EBA stress
testing data for the EU financial system in order to study the implications on stability when
contingent convertible bonds are introduced to a real financial network. To conclude, we suggest
that a regulatory intervention that replaces all unsecured interbank debt in the EU financial
system by a standardized CoCo security will create a win-win situation in which systemic risk
is decreased while bank shareholder value increases.
Notation: The following notation will be consistent for the entirety of this paper. Let x, y ∈ Rn
for some positive integer n, then
x ∧ y = (min(x1, y1),min(x2, y2), . . . ,min(xn, yn))
⊤
,
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x ∨ y = (max(x1, y1),max(x2, y2), . . . ,max(xn, yn))
⊤
,
x+ = x ∨ 0, and x− = −(x ∧ 0). Further, to ease notation, we will denote [x, y] := [x1, y1] ×
[x2, y2]× . . .× [xn, yn] ⊆ R
n to be the n-dimensional compact interval for y−x ∈ Rn+. Similarly,
we will consider x ≤ y if and only if y − x ∈ Rn+.
2 A Bank with Contingent Convertible Obligations
We first consider a single bank whose total debt obligations are structured as a combination
of pure vanilla debt and a single class of contingent convertible (CoCo) debt. To avoid techni-
cal difficulties that arise with certain CoCo specifications, we assume a variant of CoCo with
fractional conversion, as first introduced by Glasserman and Nouri (2012). This type of CoCo,
parametrized by a trigger level τ > 0 and conversion factor η ∈ [0, 1], converts a fraction of debt
to equity at a set of conversion dates 0 ≤ T1 < T2 < · · · < TK , until the maturity of the claims
at T = TK , if on these dates the equity of the issuer drops below τ times its debt. For each $1
of CoCo debt converted to equity, the total firm equity increases by $1 and the CoCo investor
receives new equity shares with value η.
In this section, we suppose the initial vanilla and CoCo debt have face values p¯0 ≥ 0 and
p¯c ≥ 0 respectively, and a fraction λ of the CoCo is converted to equity at the final conversion
date TK . Our objective here is to define clearly the relationships between the assets, debt and
equity of this bank, in all possible states of the balance sheet at the final conversion time TK .
(Earlier conversion dates are considered in Section 5.) We focus on the firm’s wealth V , defined
as the difference between total assets and total debt. Immediately after the final conversion
date TK we suppose, before considering bankruptcy, that this is given by
V˜ = x− p¯(λ)
where x ≥ 0 denotes the total external assets and
p¯(λ) := p¯0 + (1 − λ)p¯c . (1)
Wealth V is also called the capital buffer, and equals equity E if V ≥ 0, in which case
the bank is solvent. Insolvency is defined by the condition V < 0; we assume limited liability
meaning that insolvency implies the default of the bank and that the value of equity is zero. If
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a bank defaults, we also assume that only a fixed fraction α ∈ [0, 1] of its assets x are recovered
by the debtholders, in line with Veraart (2019).
Under these assumptions, the conversion fraction will be λ = 0 (no conversion) if E =
x− p¯0 − p¯c ≥ τ(p¯0 + p¯c), and will be λ = 1 (full conversion) if x− p¯0 ≤ τ p¯0. Partial conversion
with λ ∈ (0, 1) occurs if x ∈ (1− τ)× (p¯0, p¯0 + p¯c). The following relationships hold in general:
λ(V ) := 1 ∧
(
τ [p¯0 + p¯c]− V
τp¯c
)+
, (2)
V = I{V≥0}x+ I{V <0}αx− p¯(λ). (3)
Note that neither λ nor post-conversion equity E = V + depend on η.
We now need to determine how the conversion factor η ∈ [0, 1] influences the fractions
c(λ), 1− c(λ) of equity E(λ) held by the CoCo holders and original shareholders respectively for
any conversion fraction λ ∈ [0, 1]. If the external asset has value x ≥ (1+ τ)(p¯0+ p¯c) then λ = 0
and c(0) = 0. If x ∈ (1 + τ)× (p¯0, p¯0+ p¯c) so that partial conversion λ = (1+τ)(p¯
0+p¯c)−x
(1+τ)p¯c ∈ (0, 1)
results, the equity will be E(λ) = τ(p¯0 + (1 − λ)p¯c) since the bank must be at the equity-debt
ratio τ . To determine the function c(λ), we consider a small shock ∆x < 0 to the external assets
that induces a small change ∆λ = − ∆x(1+τ)p¯c . By the conversion condition for the given η,
c(λ+∆λ)E(λ +∆λ) = c(λ)Eλ + ηp¯
c∆λ+O(∆λ2)
where Eλ denotes the bank’s equity under the shock ∆x but prior to the additional ∆λ CoCo
conversion, i.e., E(λ + ∆λ) = Eλ + p¯c∆λ + O(∆λ2). Therefore, the fractional equity holdings
c(λ+∆λ) can be computed via the relation:
c(λ+∆λ) = c(λ) +
(
(η − c(λ))p¯c
τ(p¯0 + (1 − λ)p¯c
)
∆λ+O(∆λ2).
Taking the limit as ∆xր 0 (i.e., ∆λց 0) results in the differential equation
dc(λ)
dλ
=
(η − c(λ))p¯c
τ(p¯0 + (1 − λ)p¯c)
. (4)
This can be solved with initial condition c(0) = 0, giving the required formula for the proportion
c(λ) of equity owned by CoCo holders given the fractional conversion of λ ∈ [0, 1]:
c(λ) := η
[
1−
(
p¯0 + (1− λ)p¯c
p¯0 + p¯c
) 1
τ
]
(5)
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Figure 1: Example 2.1: Illustrations of the value of CoCo bonds.
We conclude this section with a simple example to demonstrate the effect of CoCo financing
on the balance sheet of a stylized bank.
Example 2.1. Consider a bank with vanilla liabilities p¯0 = 10 and CoCo liabilities p¯c = 4
structured with trigger level τ = 0.1. This means the CoCo bonds convert from debt to equity
when the debt-equity ratio exceeds 1/τ = 10. Suppose also the recovery rate at default is
α = 0.5. Notably, from (3) one finds that the wealth V of the bank satisfies a scalar fixed point
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equation parametrized by x:
V =


x+ 4λ(V )− 14 if V ≥ 0
x
2 − 10 if V < 0
In our simple example, we will demonstrate that this has an explicit solution V ∗ = V ∗(x) where
V ∗(x) =


x− 14 if x ≥ 15.4
x
11 if x ∈ [11, 15.4)
x− 10 if x ∈ [10, 11)
x
2 − 10 if x ∈ [0, 10).
The key to this construction is considering the different scenarios for the conversion of the CoCo
bonds:
• if the original equity-debt ratio overperforms the trigger level τ = 0.1 then no conversion
occurs, i.e., V = x− 14 ≥ 0.1× 14;
• if the original equity-debt ratio is such that the bank can remain at the trigger level
τ = 0.1 by converting some CoCo bonds to equity then fractional conversion occurs, i.e.,
V = x+4λ(V )− 14 = 0.1× [14− 4λ(V )] implying V = x− 10V or V = x11 occurring when
1.4− x11 ∈ [0, 1) from the construction of the fractional conversion λ;
• if the original equity-debt ratio after full conversion underperforms the trigger level τ = 0.1
then full conversion must occur, i.e., V = x− 10 ≤ 0.1× 10; and
• if after full conversion the bank is insolvent then the bankruptcy costs must be applied,
i.e., x− 10 < 0.
This outcome is plotted in Figure 1a; it shows that in the region of CoCo conversions
x ∈ [11, 15.4) the wealth V is made more stable as the external asset value declines. In contrast
to the bank which benefits uniformly from the CoCo bonds, holders of bank debt find that
CoCo bonds underperform the payoff of the vanilla debt. The value of the equity for the original
shareholders is displayed in Figure 1b under three conversion factors η = 0, 0.5, 1, i.e., in which
$1 of CoCo debt is converted to η of new equity at conversion. The original shareholders retain
the full equity of the bank for η = 0, and the value retained by the original shareholders drops
as η increases (as more of the bank’s equity is held by CoCo bond owners). The CoCo payout,
given as the total of remaining debt (1− λ(V ))p¯c and value of the equity c(λ(V ))V +, is shown
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as a fraction of the face value in Figure 1c for η = 0.5, 1. We see that the higher the conversion
factor η the more value an investor will recover from CoCo bonds; it is also true that the value
of CoCo bonds will always be dominated by the payout of the vanilla debt.
Remark 2.2. (i) The example illustrates that although CoCo bonds underperform vanilla
debt, their existence stabilizes the health of the bank. If all debts were vanilla in this
example then default would occur at x = 14 rather than at x = 10, which demonstrates
the value of CoCo bonds in a crisis scenario.
(ii) Although we assume a mechanical rule for conversion of CoCo bonds from debt to equity
as was done in, e.g., Glasserman and Nouri (2012), CoCo securities often have an optional
structure in which the issuer has a right to convert the debt at the trigger level, but not
the obligation to do so. Provided that banks are equity maximizers and the conversion
rate η is at most 1, each institution will choose to exercise the CoCo option structure using
the mechanical rules set out in this work.
3 Contagion with Contingent Convertible Bonds
The remainder of this work will focus on a network of n financial institutions labelled by i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , n} whose initial vanilla and fractional CoCo debt obligations have face values p¯0i ≥ 0
and p¯ci ≥ 0 as in Section 2. Without loss of generality, we will assume p¯
0
i + p¯
c
i > 0 for all banks
i. The CoCo parameters τi, ηi may vary across banks. These banks hold external assets and
cross-holdings of interbank debt and equity. Like network models with vanilla debt and equity
cross-holdings such as Eisenberg and Noe (2001); Rogers and Veraart (2013); Gouriéroux et al.
(2012), we seek to determine the vector of firm wealths V after network clearing at a time TK .
As in these papers, we assume the following stylized rules for clearing:
(i) Limited liabilities: the total payment made by any firm will never exceed the total assets
available to the bank.
(ii) Priority of debt claims: a firm with Vi < 0 cannot pay its debts in full and hence will
default, in which case the shareholders receive no value.
(iii) All debts are of the same seniority: in case a bank has Vi < 0 and defaults, debts are paid
out in proportion to the size of the nominal claims.
Additionally, as in the prior section, a defaulted bank will realize only a fixed fraction α ∈ [0, 1]
of its total assets. As is common in the systemic risk literature, we also add a “fictitious” bank,
labelled by i = 0, to represent the external holders of bank debt and equity.
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Our aim here is to determine the relationships between the balance sheets of all banks
i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} just after clearing and CoCo conversion takes place at time TK . We suppose the
banks have the vector of wealths V ∈ Rn and conversion factors λ ∈ [0, 1]n. The liabilities of
bank i consist of:
• Vanilla liabilities : L0i0 := π
0
i0p¯
0
i ≥ 0 is owed from bank i to entities outside the financial
system and L0ij := π
0
ij p¯
0
i ≥ 0 is owed from bank i to any other bank j;
• CoCo liabilities : (1 − λi)Lci0 is owed from bank i to entities outside the financial system
where Lci0 := π
c
i0p¯
c
i ≥ 0 is the initial face value, and (1−λi)L
c
ij is owed from bank i to any
other bank j where Lcij := π
c
ij p¯
c
i ≥ 0.
Its nominal assets with equity cross-holdings are denoted by:
• External assets : xi ≥ 0 is held in assets external to the financial network;
• Vanilla interbank debt assets :
∑n
j=1 L
0
ji where bank j owes L
0
ji ≥ 0 to bank i;
• CoCo interbank assets :
∑n
j=1(1− λj)L
c
ji of remaining CoCo debt;
• Interbank equity assets : bank i holds a fraction πeji ∈ [0, 1) of the original equity shares of
bank j plus the fraction πcji of the additional equity from the conversion of CoCo debt p¯
c
j .
We assume that L0ii = L
c
ii = 0 to eliminate self-dealing and π
e
ii = 0 to eliminate double counting
of a firm’s equity. Recall that wealth Vi of bank i is its (realized) total assets minus its total
liabilities.
To obtain the required balance sheet relationships in this network setting, we extend the
discussion of Section 2 to account for interbank debt and equity assets. First we note that (2)
still holds for each bank i:
λi(Vi) := 1 ∧
(
τip¯i(0)− Vi
τi[p¯i(0)− p¯i(1)]
)+
. (6)
In case i defaults, because all debts have the same seniority, the interbank debts to other banks
j will be paid in proportion to the fractions πdij(λi) defined by the relation
πdij(λi)p¯i(λi) = π
0
ij p¯
0
i + (1− λi)π
c
ij p¯
c
i . (7)
Here we introduce again the notation p¯i(λi) = p¯0i + (1 − λi)p¯
c
i .
If bank i is solvent, Vi ≥ 0, then as derived in Section 2, its equity is split in the ratio
ci(λi) : 1− ci(λi) between the CoCo holders and the original shareholders, where ci is given by
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(5)
ci(λi) = ηi
[
1−
(
p¯i(λi)
p¯i(0)
) 1
τ
]
.
Since any other bank j holds a fraction πeij of the original shares of i and a fraction π
c
ij of the
CoCo bonds of i, j will hold a fraction πeij(λi) of the equity of bank i after conversion, where
πeij(λi) = ci(λi)π
c
ij + (1− ci(λi))π
e
ij . (8)
Recall it also holds that when Vi ≥ 0, then the total asset value recovered from i is Vi + p¯i(λ).
Finally, we note that when Vi < 0 and i defaults, λi = 1 and, from the bankruptcy condition, it
follows that the total asset value recovered from i is α(Vi + p¯i(1)).
Putting together these formulas for the assets and liabilities of bank i gives the desired
clearing relation for the wealth Vi in terms of the wealth vector V and fractional conversion
vector λ:
Vi = xi +
n∑
j=1
πdji(λj)
[
p¯j(λj)I{Vj≥0} + α(Vj + p¯j(1))I{Vj<0}
]
+
n∑
j=1
πeji(λj)V
+
j − p¯i(λi) . (9)
3.1 Existence of Clearing Wealths
The network clearing problem to find solutions of (9) can now be characterized as finding
solutions V ∗ to a vector valued fixed point equation:
V ∗ = Φ(V ∗) , (10)
Φ(V ) := x+Πd(λ(V ))⊤
[
diag(I{V≥~0})p¯(λ(V )) + α diag(I{V <~0})(V + p¯(~1))
]
+ Πe(λ(V ))⊤V + − p¯(λ(V )) .
(11)
where Πd(λ) and Πe(λ) are the matrices defined by (7) and (8) respectively.
This clearing condition can be compared with the clearing mechanism in Banerjee and Feinstein
(2020) for a vanilla interbank market with equity cross-holdings but without contingent convert-
ible obligations. In their setting, Tarski’s fixed point theorem can be used to show that there
exists a greatest and least clearing solution to this clearing problem.
We now consider the main result of this paper – the existence of a greatest and least clearing
solution in a network model with equity cross-holding and fractional CoCo bonds.
Theorem 3.1. There exist greatest and least clearing wealth solutions V ∗+, V
∗
− of V = Φ(V ) in
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the domain
D := [−p¯(~1) , (I −Πe(~0)⊤)−1
(
(x+Πd(~0)⊤p¯(~0)− p¯(~0)) ∨ (diag(τ)p¯(~0))
)
]
if the conversion factors of all CoCo bonds are bounded by 1, i.e., η ∈ [0, 1]n.
Proof. As in the Example 2.1, we consider the four possible kinds of outcome that can occur
for bank i: no conversion of CoCo bonds when Vi ∈ I1 := [τ p¯i(0),∞) and λi = 0, strictly
fractional conversion when Vi ∈ I2 := (τ p¯i(1), τ p¯i(0)) and λi ∈ (0, 1), full conversion but solvent
Vi ∈ I3 := [0, τ p¯i(1)] and λi = 1, and default when Vi ∈ I4 := (−∞, 0) and λi = 1.
Next, for each i 6= j we introduce functions Aji(Vj) representing the assets that bank i
recovers from bank j, and Ai(V ) representing the total assets that bank i recovers
Aji(Vj) = π
d
ji(λj(Vj))
[
p¯j(λj(Vj))I{Vj≥0} + α(Vj + p¯j(1))I{Vj<0}
]
+ πeji(λj(Vj))V
+
j , (12)
Ai(V ) = xi +
n∑
j=1
Aji(Vj) . (13)
(Note that Aii ≡ 0.) Then (9) becomes
Vi = Φi(V ) = Ai(V )− p¯i(λi(Vi)) . (14)
This function Φi is nonincreasing in Vi but nondecreasing in Vj , j 6= i which means Tarski’s
fixed point theorem does not apply to V = Φ(V ). To overcome this obstacle, we use the fact
that at a fixed point V ∗, in the case of strictly fractional conversion V ∗i ∈ I2, the wealth can be
simplified because bank i must be at the trigger level, i.e., V ∗i = τpi(λi(V
∗
i )). Combining this
with (14), we find that if λi(V ∗i ) ∈ (0, 1) then at the fixed point, p¯i(λi(V
∗
i )) = (1+ τi)
−1Ai(V ∗).
This suggests that we can rewrite the clearing condition (10) in an equivalent way, as the fixed
point condition V = Φˆ(V ) where the function Φˆi(V ) is defined by
Φˆi(V ) = Φi(V ) + I{Vi∈I2}

p¯i(λi(Vi))− (1 + τi)−1(xi + n∑
j=1
Aji(Vj))

 . (15)
11
One can show that Φˆi(V ) = Fi(Ai(V )) where the univariate functions Fi are given by
Fi(Ai) =


Ai − p¯i(0) if Ai ∈ (1 + τi)× [p¯i(0),∞)
τi(1 + τi)
−1Ai if Ai ∈ (1 + τi)× [p¯i(1), p¯i(0))
Ai − p¯i(1) if Ai ∈ [1, 1 + τi]× p¯i(1)
αAi − p¯i(1) if Ai < p¯i(1) .
From this formulation, one can prove two lemmas.
Lemma 3.2. The fixed point sets of V = Φ(V ) coincide with the fixed point sets of V = Φˆ(V ).
Lemma 3.3. The univariate functions Fi(Ai) and Aji(Vj) satisfy the following properties for
all i 6= j:
(i) Fi is upper semicontinuous and nondecreasing in Ai, and bounded from below by −p¯i(1)
for Ai ≥ 0.
(ii) Aji is upper semicontinuous and nondecreasing in Vj.
This lemma immediately implies that each Ai(V ) and hence Φˆ itself is upper semicontinuous
and nondecreasing in V . Finally we need to show that Φˆ maps the domain D into itself:
(i) Let V = −p¯(~1) ≤ ~0. Then λ(V ) = ~1 and hence
Φˆ(V ) = αA(V )− p¯(~1) ≥ V .
(ii) Let V = (I−Πe(~0)⊤)−1
(
(x+Πd(~0)⊤p¯(~0)− p¯(~0)) ∨ (diag(τ)p¯(~0))
)
. By construction, V¯ ≥
(I − Πe(~0)⊤)V ≥ diag(τ)p¯(~0) which implies λ(V ) = ~0 and hence Φˆ(V ) = Φ(V ) = A(V )−
p¯(~0). Since A(V ) = x+Π(~0)⊤p¯(~0) + πe(~0)⊤V we have
Φˆ(V )− V = x+Π(~0)⊤p¯(~0)− p¯(~0)− (I − πe(~0)⊤)V ≤ ~0
(iii) By the monotonicity of Φˆ, for any V ∈ D, V ≤ Φˆ(V ) ≤ Φˆ(V ) ≤ Φˆ(V ) ≤ V , hence
Φˆ(V ) ∈ D.
Given the two lemmas, we have shown that Φˆ is a monotone nondecreasing function from the
complete lattice D onto itself, and from Tarski’s fixed point theorem we draw the standard
conclusion that it has a greatest and least fixed point in D.
The proof of Lemma 3.2 is left to the reader.
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Proof of Lemma 3.3. The statement for Fi is trivial to verify. Similarly, the only non-trivial
statement for Aji(Vj) to verify is monotonicity in the conversion region where λj(Vj) ∈ (0, 1).
For this, we can write
Aji(Vj(λj)) = xj + π
d
ji(λ)p¯j(λ) + τ p¯j(λ)π
e
ji(λ)
and show by differentiation that it is non-increasing with respect to λ. We use (7), (8) and the
differential equation (4) for cj and find
dAji
dλj
= −πcjip¯
c
j[1 + (ηj − cj) + τjcj ]− π
e
jip¯
c
j[(ηj − cj) + (1− λ)τjcj ] (16)
for which every term is explicitly non-positive.
We conclude this section by remarking on the computation of the greatest clearing solution
V ∗ = Φ(V ∗). This can be found via Picard iterations of Φˆ, defined in (15), beginning at
V (0) = (I − Πe(~0)⊤)−1
[
(x+Πd(~0)⊤p¯(~0)− p¯(~0)) ∨ (diag(τ)p¯(~0))
]
. By upper semicontinuity,
these fixed point iterations will converge to the maximal clearing wealths.
4 Discussion
In this section, we will compare interbank networks that include CoCo bonds to similar in-
terbank network models of equity cross-holdings and vanilla debt such as those presented
in Rogers and Veraart (2013). In this section, all CoCo bonds are assumed to have friction-
less conversion η = 1, as well as assumptions ensuring that the results of Theorem 3.1 hold.
The comparisons we make in this section will be helpful in determining settings in which
introducing CoCo bonds, or “CoCo-izing” debt obligations, may improve system behavior. We
measure system performance by the set of defaulting banks: We say system A outperforms
system B if DA ⊆ DB where D• denotes the set of defaulting institutions under the maximal
clearing solution in a given system. Note that it is entirely possible that two systems are not
comparable in such a way. We now provide an extreme setting in which the CoCo-ized system
outperforms (consistent) strict interbank networks, and then provide a simple counterexample
showing that this ordering does not hold in general.
Proposition 4.1. Consider a contingent system of obligations that is fully CoCo-ized, i.e.,
p¯0 = ~0. Such a contingent system will have no defaults. Therefore, the contingent system
outperforms all other financial systems.
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x1 x2 x0
L12 = p¯1
L21
L20
Figure 2: Example 4.3: Network topology of interbank obligations.
Proof. Let D denote the set of defaulting banks in the CoCo-ized network. Assume D 6= ∅. Take
i ∈ D, i.e., V ∗i < 0 and note that p¯i(1) = p¯
0
i = 0. By construction of the fractional conversion,
λi(V
∗
i ) = 1. As such, by the construction of the clearing mechanism
0 > V ∗i = αAi(V
∗)− p¯i(1) = αAi(V ∗) ≥ 0
since the assets Ai(V ∗) ≥ 0 by construction. Thus we have a contradiction and it must hold that
D = ∅. As an immediate consequence, it must follow that the contingent system outperforms
any other network.
Remark 4.2. As we have shown that the fully CoCo-ized system will outperform any other
network, this is true for any system with consistent parameters. That is, consider a vanilla
interbank network with fixed obligations Lˆ := diag(~1 − λ)L and interbank equity assets Πˆe :=
Πe(λ) for any fractional conversion λ ∈ [0, 1]n; allow all other parameters to keep their constant
values. This partially CoCo-ized system will be outperformed by the fully CoCo-ized network.
We now provide a simple counterexample to show that CoCo bonds do not uniformly improve
system performance. This is undertaken by making such comparisons over consistent networks
as considered in Remark 4.2.
Example 4.3. Consider a 2 bank and societal node system as depicted in Figure 2. We will
first consider two networks – a purely vanilla interbank network and one where some obligations
have been CoCo-ized – with zero recovery at default (α = 0) for which we can show analytically
that the introduction of CoCo bonds can make a financial system worse. We will then generalize
parameters in this system in order to understand heuristics for when CoCo bonds may be helpful
for financial stability.
(i) Consider a standard interbank network in the vein of Rogers and Veraart (2013) with no
vanilla interbank equity assets (i.e., πeij = 0 for i, j ∈ {1, 2}) and no CoCo bonds. Let
the external assets be x1 = 6 and x2 = 1, the interbank liabilities be L12 = 10, L20 =
L21 = 5, and all other liabilities be identically 0. As such, p¯1 = L12 and p¯2 = L20 + L21
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with associated relative liability matrix Π0. By construction, a simple clearing solution is
provided by:
V ∗1 = x1 + L21 − p¯1 = 1
V ∗2 = x2 + p¯1 − p¯2 = 1.
It is clear that V ∗ ∈ R2+ and thus neither bank defaults.
(ii) Consider the same interbank network, but now where β1 ∈ [0, 1] of bank 1’s liabilities
are CoCo-ized with trigger level τ1 = 1 and with full conversion η1 = 1. This choice of
parameters leads to the construction πe12(λ1) = β1λ1. By the construction of the fractional
conversion there are two cases to consider:
(a) If β1 ∈ [ 710 , 1] then bank 2 will be in default with exactly
7
10β1
× 100% CoCo bonds
triggered. The resultant maximal clearing wealths are given by:
V ∗1 = x1 − p¯1(
7
10β1
) = 3 > 0
V ∗2 = −p¯2 = −10 < 0.
We wish to note that, in this setting, the CoCo bonds improve the wealth of bank
1, but cause bank 2 to default. To prove that this is the maximal clearing solution,
consider this problem in the vein of a fictitious default algorithm. Assuming neither
bank defaults the wealths would be V (0)1 =
11
2 > 0 and V
(0)
2 = −
41
40 < 0. This then
implies bank 2 must default, and the above clearing solution results.
(b) If β1 ∈ [0 , 710 ] then all CoCo bonds will be triggered and there are three sub-settings
to consider:
i. If β1 ∈ [0 , 9−
√
41
20 ] then both banks are solvent with maximal clearing wealths
V ∗1 = x1 + L21 − p¯1(1) = 1 + 10β1 > 0
V ∗2 = x1 + p¯1(1) + c12(1)V
∗
1 − p¯2 = 10β
2
1 − 9β1 + 1 ≥ 0.
We wish to note that, in this setting, the CoCo bonds improve the wealth of
bank 1, but decreases the wealth of bank 2. With these alterations, the total
(system-wide) wealth improves with increased CoCo-ization β1.
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ii. If β1 ∈ (9−
√
41
20 ,
4
10 ) then both banks are insolvent with maximal clearing vector
V ∗1 = −p¯1(1) = −10(1− β1) < 0
V ∗2 = −p¯2 = −10 < 0.
This can be proven via a fictitious default algorithm. First, assuming neither
bank defaults then the wealths would be V (0)1 = 1 + 10β1 > 0 and V
(0)
2 =
10β21 − 9β1 + 1 < 0. Therefore, bank 2 must default. This adjusts the value of
bank 1 to V (1)1 = −4 + 10β1 < 0 and therefore both banks must default.
iii. If β1 ∈ [ 410 ,
7
10 ) then bank 2 is insolvent with maximal clearing wealths
V ∗1 = x1 − p¯1(1) = −4 + 10β1 > 0
V ∗2 = −p¯2 = −10 < 0.
This can again be proven via a fictitious default algorithm. First, assuming
neither bank defaults implies the wealths would be V (0)1 = 1 + 10β1 > 0 and
V
(0)
2 = 10β
2
1 − 9β1 + 1 < 0. Therefore, bank 2 must default, and the above
clearing solution results.
These analytical results show that the conditions for comparing a CoCo-ized system to a strict
interbank network are non-trivial and non-monotonic.
We now consider more broadly how the recovery rate α ∈ [0, 1], trigger levels τ ∈ R2+, and
fraction of liabilities made contingent β ∈ [0, 1]2 interact in this example. To do so we specify
three recovery rates: no recovery, fractional recovery, and full recovery (α ∈ {0, 13 , 1}) and three
trigger levels: low, medium, and high (τ1 = τ2 ∈ {1, 2, 5}). These nine scenarios are then com-
pared over the range of CoCo-ization fractions β ∈ [0, 1]2 to determine the default scenarios.
Figure 3 provides images of the varying default scenarios under these varying network param-
eters. Notably, changing the recovery rate does not affect the general shape of the defaulting
regions but only the sum total of defaulting institutions. However, the trigger level causes sig-
nificant impacts to the defaulting regions. This indicates that for CoCo bonds to be utilized for
financial stability, they should be implemented with low trigger levels wherever possible.
Remark 4.4. Proposition 4.1 and Example 4.3 present an intriguing relationship for the use
of CoCo bonds in regulation. If a regulatory agency dictated that all bonds must be CoCo-ized
dependent on leverage and capital adequacy requirements, then these requirements will always
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(a) α = 0 and τ = 1 (b) α = 0 and τ = 2 (c) α = 0 and τ = 5
(d) α = 13 and τ = 1 (e) α =
1
3 and τ = 2 (f) α =
1
3 and τ = 5
(g) α = 1 and τ = 1 (h) α = 1 and τ = 2 (i) α = 1 and τ = 5
Figure 3: Example 4.3: Impact of varying network parameters on the set of defaulting firms for a
2 bank system.
be satisfied and no forced deleveraging will occur. However, this would occur at the expense
of other investors and funds, which may ultimately trigger greater systemic problems than it
prevented.
5 Contingent Convertible Bond Networks with Multiple
Conversion Dates
So far in this work, we have considered conversion of CoCo bonds at maturity only. In this
section we introduce a multi-period discrete time framework and consider a network of vanilla
and contingent obligations due on some day T ≥ 0 in which the trigger level for the CoCo
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bonds are checked on days t ∈ {T1, T2, ..., TK := T }. Due to these checks, even if a bank is well
capitalized at the maturity of the obligations, conversion of debt for equity can occur at earlier
times.
For this setting, we will consider a minimal modification from the single period setup pre-
sented in Section 3. Let L0ij ≥ 0 be the vanilla interbank debt from firm i to j fixed at time
t = 0 and due at maturity T . Let Lc,0ij ≥ 0 be the CoCo interbank debt from firm i to j
fixed at time t = 0 and due at maturity T . Let πe,0ij denote the initial fractional holdings of
firm i’s equity held by bank j fixed at time t = 0. To separate the effects of contingent con-
vertible bonds from those of dynamic network models (as in, e.g., Capponi and Chen (2015);
Kusnetsov and Veraart (2019); Banerjee et al. (2018)), all obligations in this section will be
zero-coupon. Additionally, at time t ∈ {T1, T2, ..., TK} consider the value of the external assets
xi(t) ≥ 0 of bank i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} following some stochastic process. Finally for simplicity let
the risk-free rate r = 0 be zero.
At time t ∈ {T1, T2, ..., TK}, some of the CoCo assets and liabilities may have already con-
verted to equity assets and liabilities previously. To keep track of these modifications to the
balance sheet over time, let λti ∈ [0, 1] denote the fractional conversion of remaining CoCo bonds
at time t issued by bank i. Then let Lc,tij := (1 − λ
t
i)L
c,t−1
ij denote the not yet converted CoCo
debt issued by bank i and held by bank j at the end of time t, and let p¯c,ti :=
∑n
j=0 L
c,t
ij denote
the total remaining CoCo debt issued by bank i after time t clearing occurs. With these con-
versions, the fractional holdings of equity will change over time as well. Denote the fractional
holdings by the CoCo bond holders cti of bank i by
cti(λ
t
i) = c
t−1
i
[
p¯0i + (1− λ
t
i)p¯
c,t−1
i
p¯0i + p¯
c,t−1
i
] 1
τi
+ ηi

1−
[
p¯0i + (1 − λ
t
i)p¯
c,t−1
i
p¯0i + p¯
c,t−1
i
] 1
τi


= η

1−
[
p¯0i + (1− λ
t
i)p¯
c,t−1
i
p¯0i + p¯
c,0
i
] 1
τi

 .
As in Section 3, the equity cross-holdings matrix is defined for each pair of banks i, j:
πe,tij (λ
t
i) = π
c
ijc
t
i(λ
t
i) + π
e,0
ij (1− c
t
i(λ
t
i)).
It remains to determine the fractional conversion λt that occurs at time t ∈ {T1, T2, ..., TK}
based on trigger levels τ . As in the one period setting, this is dependent on the value of equity
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E(t) at time t and the other system parameters, i.e.,
λti(E(t)) := 1 ∧
(
τi[p¯
0
i + p¯
c,t−1
i ]− Ei(t)
τip¯
c,t−1
i
)+
(17)
for every bank i and any time t ∈ {T1, T2, ..., TK}. If all CoCo bonds have previously been
converted to equity (i.e., p¯c,t−1i = 0) then this fractional conversion is irrelevant and can be
arbitrarily chosen.
Intrinsic to (17) is the value of equity (at time t ∈ {T1, T2, ..., TK}) for each firm. In order
to proceed, we assume, as in Glasserman and Nouri (2012), that the book value of equity is
taken at all times t. In order to accomplish this, at any time t < T interbank assets will be
marked in full due to historical price accounting. Additionally, we will assume that, when pricing
equity, only the conversion from debt to equity from the CoCo bonds at time t will be taken
into account. For notational simplicity and for comparison to the notation of Section 3, let
p¯ti(0) = p¯
0
i + p¯
c,t−1
i and p¯
t
i(1) = p¯
0
i for every bank i and at time t. With this construction, and
the same logic as in the construction of Φˆ from (15), we find, at time t < T , that the wealths
can be valued by:
Vi(t) =


Ati(V (t))− p¯
t
i(0) if A
t
i(V (t)) ≥ (1 + τi)p¯
t
i(0)
τi
1+τi
Ati(V (t)) if A
t
i(V (t)) ∈ (1 + τi)× [p¯
t
i(1), p¯
t
i(0))
Ati(V (t))− p¯
t
i(1) if A
t
i(V (t)) < (1 + τi)p¯
t
i(1)
(18)
Ati(V (t)) = xi(t) +
n∑
j=1
[
L0ji + (1− λ
t
j(Vj(t)
+))Lc,t−1ji
]
+
n∑
j=1
Πe,tji (λ
t
j(Vj(t)
+))Vj(t)
+
and equity E(t) := V (t)+ is defined as the positive book wealth. Though a bank’s book equity
may be 0, in this setup we assume that no default can occur until maturity T .
Remark 5.1. In this work we consider the book value of equity prior to maturity. This is in con-
trast to recent work on network valuation adjustments Barucca et al. (2016); Banerjee and Feinstein
(2020) in which the market value is undertaken endogenously from the clearing system. Market
equity valuation with contingent debts is beyond the scope of this work.
With this setup, the existence of a clearing procedure over time can be addressed. At all
times prior to maturity, this is taken as the clearing procedure of (18) in the book value of
wealth; at maturity the problem reduces to that considered in Theorem 3.1 in the actualized
wealth. Algorithm 5.3 presents a method for constructing the clearing solution forward in time.
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Corollary 5.2. Fix time t ∈ {T1, T2, ..., TK−1}. There exists a greatest and least clearing book
value of wealth satisfying (18) in
Dt := [−p¯t(~1) , (I − (Πe,t−1(λt−1))⊤)−1
(
(x(t) + Πd,t(~0)⊤p¯t(~0)− p¯t(~0)) ∨ (diag(τ)p¯t(~0))
)
]
⊆ L∞(σ({x(0), x(1), ..., x(t)})).
Proof. This is a direct extension of the proof of Theorem 3.1 and an application of Tarski’s fixed
point theorem on the lattice Dt.
We conclude this section by constructing an algorithm in order to present the “optimal”
clearing solution over time for some realization of the external market x.
Algorithm 5.3. (i) Initiate k = 0 and network parameters L0, Lc,0,Πe,0;
(ii) Increment k = k + 1;
(iii) If k = K then find the maximal clearing wealths V (TK) = Φ(V (TK)) from (11) and
terminate;
(iv) Let V (Tk) be the maximal clearing book wealths satisfying (18) and λt := λt(V (Tk)+) be
the associated fractional conversions satisfying (17);
(v) Update network parameters Lc,Tk := (1− λTk)Lc,Tk−1 and Πe,Tk := Πe,Tk(λTk);
(vi) Return to step (ii).
By an application of Corollary 5.2 and Theorem 3.1, this algorithm is guaranteed to provide a
unique clearing solution. Additionally, this is called optimal as, at every time t ∈ {T1, T2, ..., TK},
the equilibrium is chosen so as to maximize the equity at that specific time. It is, however,
possible that a different solution early on may ultimately lead to higher potential equity at the
terminal time.
6 European Banking Authority Case Study
In this section we undertake a detailed case study for the implications of CoCo bonds on sys-
temic risk in the EU system, using the data from the 2011 EBA stress test to calibrate the
network of obligations. This data set has been studied in, e.g., Gandy and Veraart (2016);
Chen et al. (2016); Feinstein (2019); Feinstein et al. (2018) under the default contagion model
of Eisenberg and Noe (2001).1
1Due to complications with the calibration methodology, we only consider 87 of the 90 institutions. DE029, LU45,
and SI058 were not included in this analysis.
20
The EBA stress test data set provides information on the total assets TAi, capital Ci, and
interbank liabilities
∑n
j=1 Lij for all banks i for a date in 2011. We construct stylized balance
sheets consistent with this data, by making additional assumptions. First, since equity cross-
holdings between systemically important financial institutions are typically small, we assume the
original equity cross-holdings are given by πeij = 0 for every pair of firms i, j. Next, we assume
that all assets that are not interbank must be external and all liabilities that are not capital
or interbank must be external, and moreover, as in Chen et al. (2016); Glasserman and Young
(2015), we assume that interbank liabilities are equal to interbank assets
∑n
j=1 Lij =
∑n
j=1 Lji.
2
Under these assumptions, the external assets and liabilities are given by
xi := TAi −
n∑
j=1
Lji and Li0 := TAi −
n∑
j=1
Lij − Ci.
Having calibrated the external assets and liabilities, as well as the total asset and liabili-
ties, we still require the full nominal liabilities matrix L. To find a single realization of the
liability matrix consistent with the calibrated row and column sums, we utilize the method
of Gandy and Veraart (2016) with parameters p = 0.5, thinning = 104, nburn-in = 109, and
λ = pn(n−1)∑n
i=1
∑
n
j=1
Lij
≈ 0.00122.
In these case studies we adopt both the static time framework from Section 3 and the
dynamic time framework from Section 5 and, in a similar approach to Example 4.3, consider
the implications on systemic risk through CoCo-izing the debts L at varying trigger levels.
Throughout this section we take the recovery rate α = 12 and conversion rate η = 1. In
contrast to Section 4, herein we define the systemic risk measure as the fraction of total external
liabilities that are paid at maturity T , as debt, or if CoCo-ized, as equity. A histogram of the
size of these external obligations, as a fraction of the total external liabilities of e23.381 trillion
across the system of banks, is displayed in Figure 4. Summary statistics of the system-wide
balance sheet are provided in Table 1. We note that the obligations described by this data set
are, predominantly, unsecured. This is due to the nature of interbank lending in Europe and,
as such, fits within the clearing payment system described within this work.
Example 6.1. In this example we will undertake a stress-testing study of the contingent network
model, calibrated as discussed above to the EBA data, within the static framework of Section 3.
As with Example 4.3, let β ∈ [0, 1] denote the fraction of liabilities that have been made into
contingent convertible bonds. For this study we assume that all banks follow the same CoCo-
2In actuality, as done in Gandy and Veraart (2016), we perturb the interbank assets slightly so as to satisfy some
technical conditions.
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Figure 4: Histogram of the fractional amount that external liabilities take up of the total obligations
among banks in the 2011 EBA stress test data set.
Total Assets (etrillion) Total Liabilities (etrillion)
External: 24.383 23.381
Interbank: 3.072 3.072
Capital: – 1.002
Table 1: Summary statistics of the banking system from the 2011 EBA stress test data set.
ization level β with the same trigger level τ ∈ (0, 1]. Herein we consider two different CoCo-izing
schemes:
• full CoCo-ization: β fraction of all debts, both interbank and external, are CoCo-ized; and
• interbank CoCo-ization: β fraction of interbank debts only are CoCo-ized with all external
debts remaining vanilla.
We do not consider external CoCo-ization where all external debts are CoCo-ized with all
interbank debts remaining vanilla: This scheme appears approximately equivalent to the full
CoCo-ization scheme. For the purposes of this case study, we consider a stress-test scenario
under which the external assets of all banks are decreased by 3%. At β = 0 both schemes
correspond with the plain Eisenberg-Noe system (i.e., all debts are vanilla); under the stress
scenario 72 of the 87 banks are in default and approximately 51.48% of debt owed to society is
repaid. The results of varying β and τ are displayed in Figures 5 and 6.
In Figures 5a and 5b the fractional repayment of external liabilities is displayed under full
CoCo-ization and interbank CoCo-ization respectively. First we note the similarities between
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these two schemes, looking for heuristics that may generally hold. In particular, the behavior of
the system becomes worse as the trigger level τ increases, but there is a non-monotonic response
to the level of CoCo-ization β. Unlike in the dynamic time framework considered in the final
example, in this static setting the best case scenario is for full repayment. For this reason the
health of the system is monotonic in the trigger level τ : the greater the trigger level τ the more
often debts are converted and, as the equity has no time to grow, a write-down occurs. Now
consider the full CoCo-ization scheme depicted in Figure 5a. For low levels of CoCo-ization,
there is a significant number of defaults (as is the case in the purely Eisenberg-Noe setting
with β = 0), but at a threshold level of β ≈ 1.2% the cascade of defaults is eliminated and all
banks become solvent with the external system (i.e. the real economy) recovering approximately
99.84% of the face value of its initial holdings. However, as more debts are CoCo-ized, even
though no additional defaults occur, the fractional repayment to the external system decreases;
this is especially noticeable for higher trigger levels τ . In contrast, for the interbank CoCo-
ization scheme depicted in Figure 5b, the interaction between level of CoCo-ization β and the
trigger level τ is more complicated. For relatively low trigger levels τ , the external system
recovers as much as 99.86% repayment at β ≈ 11.7% CoCo-ization. However, for higher trigger
levels, significant defaults may still be exhibited. We conclude the discussion of payments by
directly comparing the full CoCo-ization and interbank CoCo-ization schemes. Clearly, for much
of the region, full CoCo-ization outperforms the interbank CoCo-ization by significant margins.
However, for high CoCo-ization levels β the two schemes are comparable or, even better under
interbank CoCo-ization for high trigger levels τ .
In Figures 6a and 6b the value for the original shareholders is displayed under full CoCo-
ization and interbank CoCo-ization respectively. Notably, under full CoCo-ization, the original
shareholders benefit under higher trigger levels τ and greater CoCo-ization. In fact, by com-
paring Figures 6a and 5a, it becomes clear that for CoCo-ization with high enough β so that
defaults are avoided, the original shareholders benefit at the expense of the bond holders and
vice versa. In contrast, interbank CoCo-ization can increase the original shareholder value only
to a minimal degree, and does so in tandem with increasing benefits for the external debthold-
ers as shown in Figures 6b and 5b. Clearly, the full CoCo-ization scheme benefits the original
shareholders more than interbank CoCo-ization, but the original shareholders would prefer both
schemes over the no CoCo-ization scheme (β = 0).
Example 6.2. In this example we continue to study the EU network in the static framework
of Section 3, now with a variable stress testing scenario and 4 distinct CoCo-ization schemes:
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(a) Full CoCo-ization (b) Interbank CoCo-ization
Figure 5: Example 6.1: Impact of varying fraction of contingent convertible bonds (β) and their
trigger level (τ) on payments to the real economy using the 2011 EBA stress testing data.
(a) Full CoCo-ization (b) Interbank CoCo-ization
Figure 6: Example 6.1: Impact of varying fraction of contingent convertible bonds (β) and their
trigger level (τ) on the value for the original shareholders using the 2011 EBA stress testing data.
• no CoCo-ization: all debts, both interbank and external, remain vanilla;
• full CoCo-ization: all debts, both interbank and external, are CoCo-ized with trigger level
τ = 0.05;
• interbank CoCo-ization: all interbank debts are CoCo-ized with trigger level τ = 0.05 with
all external debts remaining vanilla; and
• external CoCo-ization: all external debts are CoCo-ized with trigger level τ = 0.05 with
all interbank debts remaining vanilla.
The no CoCo-ization scheme corresponds with the plain Eisenberg-Noe system. For the purposes
of this case study, we stress the external assets of all banks by a variable fraction ξ, so that
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(c) Number of defaults
Figure 7: Example 6.2: Impact of varying stress levels (ξ) on payments to the real economy, value
for the original shareholders, and banking defaults using the 2011 EBA stress testing data.
x∗ = (1−ξ)x external assets are available to the banks. The results of varying ξ ∈ [0%, 10%] are
displayed in Figure 7. In Figure 7a, the value of debts owed external to the system is displayed.
In Figure 7b, the value for the original shareholders is displayed. In Figure 7c, the number
of defaulting banks is plotted as a function of the stress level ξ. Notably, the system without
CoCo-ization performs poorly, quickly encountering large number of defaults, low repayment
under low stress scenarios, and large losses for the original shareholders. The full CoCo-ization
and external CoCo-ization schemes are very similar; under both schemes, all banks remain
solvent and the losses to the external system are solely caused by the fractional conversion of
CoCo debts (see Example 2.1 for a simple construction for such losses). In fact, the no CoCo-
ization scheme, for debtholders, outperforms both the full and external CoCo-ization schemes
at low stress levels (ξ ≤ 1.77%). In constrast, the original shareholders strictly prefer either
full and external CoCo-ization over the scheme without CoCo-ization. Finally, the interbank
CoCo-ization scheme outperforms the payments for all other schemes for much more sizeable
stresses (ξ ≤ 3.77%), albeit at the expense of a single bank defaulting. Beyond ξ = 3.77%
the interbank CoCo-ization exhibits significant default contagion, though it always outperforms
the no CoCo-ization scheme in repayments of debts, equity for the original shareholders, and
defaults.
Example 6.3. In this example we study the unstressed (ξ = 0) EU network in the dynamic
framework of Section 5 under the full CoCo-ization scheme. Consider now the dynamic frame-
work of Section 5. In this example we will undertake a numerical study of the EBA data
calibrated as discussed above, but without any stress scenario. As with the prior example, let
β ∈ [0, 1] denote the fraction of liabilities that have been made into contingent convertible bonds;
this CoCo-ization takes place for all liabilities (the full CoCo-ization scheme from Example 6.1).
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(a) 1 time step (b) 2 time steps (c) 4 time steps
Figure 8: Example 6.3: Impact on fractional repayment of external obligations by varying the
number of time steps in a dynamic model of contingent convertible bonds.
For this study we assume that all banks follow the same level β and the same trigger level
τ ∈ (0, 1]. The dynamic setting requires the external assets to evolve over time, and thus we
will assume that external assets follow correlated geometric Brownian motions. We take the
initial values x(0) = x and simulate the geometric Brownian motion forwards in time until time
1 year.3 The remaining parameters for the external asset processes are fixed as follows: the risk-
free rate r = 0 is fixed, the physical and risk-neutral measures are assumed to be identical, each
bank has volatility σ = 20% (from comparisons to annualized historical volatility of European
markets in 2011), and all banks have 75% pairwise correlation.
A single realization of the external asset process is simulated, leading to the results displayed
in Figures 8 and 9 for the cases of 1, 2, and 4 equally spaced time steps. Note that the single
time step setting corresponds exactly with the static model of Example 6.1 under full CoCo-
ization, except now the value of the external assets is random. In contrast to the static setting,
increasing the number of time steps evaluated can now produce gains for the debt holders in
the system. As indicated by the red areas of Figures 8b and 8c, there are regions of gains as
large as 13% for the real economy due to contingent convertible bonds. However, these gains
for CoCo debt holders are at the expense of the original shareholders as indicated by the blue
areas of Figures 9b and 9c. Finally, we note that the network parameters that cause losses to
the debt holders in the static single time step framework cause comparable losses in the discrete
time systems. Thus, for the purposes of stress testing, a static model may be appropriate and
alleviate the complexity involved in the discrete time framework.
3We could, instead, consider a backwards evolution of the external assets so that x(1) = x, but such a setting is
directly comparable to the static setting depicted in Example 6.1 above.
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(a) 1 time step (b) 2 time steps (c) 4 time steps
Figure 9: Example 6.3: Impact on the value for the original shareholders by varying the number
of time steps in a dynamic model of contingent convertible bonds.
7 Conclusion
In this work we studied a network model of interbank obligations and equity that includes CoCo
bond obligations between firms. We proved general conditions for the existence of maximal and
minimal clearing solutions under this setting with bankruptcy costs. From the perspective of
financial stability, we proved that if all liabilities are rewritten as contingent convertible bonds,
then the financial system will never experience any defaults. However, if only partial obligations
are CoCo bonds, then this can cause increased defaults in the interbank system. Heuristically,
we come to the conclusion that lower trigger levels for the CoCo bonds in the system tend to
improve the financial stability. Countering this instinct, which would be a worthwhile follow-up
study, the lower the trigger level the higher the interest rate that would need to be offered so
as to make the CoCo bond attractive for investors. This would, ultimately, increase the total
liabilities of the issuer which can counteract the improvements in financial stability that may
result from the CoCo bonds.
Additionally, we consider a network of CoCo bonds in a discrete time setting so that con-
version from debt to equity may occur prior to maturity. This is presented in a setting with the
book value of equity over time. An interesting extension of this work, along with further work
on network valuation adjustments, is to endogenize the market value of equity in this system.
Based on the theoretical and numerical results, especially in our EBA case studies from
Section 6, we propose that CoCo bonds should be used for interbank debts only. Heuristically,
at the low trigger level τ = 0.05 with full conversion η = 1, CoCo-izing all interbank debts
stabilizes the system above the no CoCo setting with a higher value for the original shareholders
as well. This interbank CoCo-ization, empirically, reduces system defaults without the external
system realizing any writedowns due to the conversion of CoCo debt into equity. In addition, the
original shareholders in the banks realize at least as high a value as the no CoCo setting without
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the risk of large losses due to the early conversion of CoCo debts as exhibited by the full or
external CoCo-ization schemes. In fact, we caution against external debts being redenominated
since, beyond the threshold at which CoCo bonds rescue the system from defaults, they can
cause significant writedowns without any defaults occurring. Due to these writedowns, CoCo
bonds will likely be less expensive than the vanilla instruments, i.e., higher interest rates will
need to be offered to raise the same amount of cash which can cause greater total liabilities
and interlinkages, as such we propose the full conversion factor η = 1 so that the purchasers
of these instruments can be appropriately renumerated for the potential drop in value of the
CoCo bonds at or below the trigger level τ . Further work on network valuation and network
formation are necessary to adequately test this heuristic belief on where CoCo bonds should be
implemented in the financial system.
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